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RELIGION, DEMOCRACY, AND AUTONOMY: A POLITICAL
PARABLE
STEVEN D. SMiTH*
I.
Should legislators feel free to rely on their religious beliefs in
deciding how to vote on, say, an abortion regulation, or a same-sex
marriage bill? Should citizens be encouraged to resort to their
religious faith as they vote in an election? Should judges consult
their religious convictions in deciding how to rule in a difficult case?
Or does such reliance on religion in public decision making
somehow violate, if not the Constitution itself, at least the meaning
or spirit of democracy?
Debate focusing explicitly on these questions-or what one might
call the "religion-and-democracy" debate-has raged in the academy
for about a decade and a half by now,1 and the contours of the
debate have become familiar. For me, the debate continues to be
interesting in part because it is a sort of pale reflection of other
debates that might have been common in less civilized times but
that, in the freedom of the modem enlightened academy, we are no
longer able to have. So I want very quickly to make several
* Robert and Marion Short Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Paul Campos,
Rick Garnett, Kent Greenawalt, Vittorio Hosle, Andy Koppleman, Bob Nagel, and Michael
Perry for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. For an early exchange of views on the issue, see Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of
Rationality and the Place ofReligious Conviction: ProtectingAnimals and the Environment,
27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1011 (1986), and responses by Michael Perry, Fred Schauer, Michael
Smith, and Diane Zimmerman. See bMichaelJ. Perry, Comment on "The Limits ofRationality
and the Place ofReligious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment," 27 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1067 (1986); Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. &
MARYL. REV. 1075 (1986); Michael E. Smith, Religious Activism: The Historical Record, 27
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1087 (1986); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, To Walk a Crooked Path.
Separating Law and Religion in the Secular State, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1095 (1986). For
a more recent collection of well-argued perspectives, see RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY
LIBERALISM (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997).
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observations about the character of the current debate, to identify
what I think is a "red herring," and to describe what seems to me
to be the real, underlying issue. I will then use the bulk of this
Essay to explore-in an oblique, law professor's way-this
underlying issue that is crucial, I think, not only to this particular
debate, but to a good deal of our modern self-understanding.
Let me start by observing something obvious: In the con-
temporary academic debate about religion in politics, democracy
provides the axiom from which virtually everyone argues. Some
professors will contend that citizens, or perhaps legislators, have a
right to invoke the Bible or appeal to theology in debating and
deciding political issues, but the professors themselves typically do
not exercise any such right in debating these issues. They would not
think to approach the question, for instance, by asking whether God
would want people to rely on faith in making their political
decisions. And even if this question does occur to the professors, the
conventions of academic discourse prevent it from being raised and
considered, at least in any straightforward manner. So instead, law
professors and political theorists argue about whether it is more
consistent with democracy for people to debate and vote on public
matters on whatever grounds (religious or secular) appeal to them
or, conversely, to check their faith at the door before entering the
public domain. In effect, academics treat the issue they are arguing
about with respect to the broader political culture (is it permissible
to rely upon religious grounds?) as an issue that has already been
resolved, in the negative, for purposes of the academy itself. This
treatment, to say the least, gives the debate a somewhat peculiar
quality.
Even framed in this way, though, the debate does not necessarily
imply a negative answer to the issue for the broader culture. On the
contrary, when the debate is understood as one about the
implications of democracy, perhaps the more obvious answer is an
affirmative one: Wouldn't democracy imply that"the people" can act
on any grounds they see fit to act on?' The puzzlement is reflected
in Sanford Levinson's question: "Why doesn't liberal democracy give
2. But see FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 33-34, 38 (1999) (arguing
that the meaning and requirements of democracy cannot be democratically determined).
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everyone an equal right, without engaging in any version of
epistemic abstinence, to make his or her arguments, subject,
obviously, to the prerogative of listeners to reject the arguments
should they be unpersuasive... ?"3 There is an important, even
portentous answer to that question, I think, but it is not the most
familiar answer, which I believe to be a "red herring." The familiar
answer suggests that democratic deliberation, or perhaps even
democratic legitimacy, requires that public decisions should be
made on the basis of reasons "accessible" to all citizens.4 This
position has been effectively criticized,5 however, and I doubt that
it fully captures democracy-based resistance to religion in public
discourse.
One major reason for this doubt is that the accessibility position,
taken at face value, does not faithfully serve the purposes of its own
proponents. This is because, if "accessible" is taken to mean
something like "intelligible" or "understandable," the constraint
excludes the wrong things. Many complicated scientific and
philosophical analyses will not be "accessible" in this sense to many
or most of us; conversely, many of the most controversial religious
rationales will be readily understandable. "God prohibits homo-
sexual conduct" is an idea not especially difficult to understand in
an ordinary sense,6 though of course its truth, its admissibility, and
its philosophical meaningfulness are all debatable. Conversely, if
"accessible" is taken to mean something more like "believable" or
"generally accepted," then the "accessibility" requirement would
3. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV.
2061,2077 (1992). For an expression of a similar puzzlement, see Douglas Laycock, Freedom
of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793 (1996).
4. For a helpful and generally sympathetic discussion of the "accessibility" constraint,
see MICHAELJ. PERRYLOVEANDPOWEETHEROLEOFRELIGIONANDMORAIJTYINAMERICAN
POLITICS 105-22 (1991). Of course, not all proponents and critics use exactly the same
vocabulary or mean the same thing by "accessibility."
5. Following athorough examination, for example, Kent Greenawalt concluded that "the
claim that citizens and legislators should rely exclusively on secular grounds," a claim that
Greenawaltunderstood and discussed largelyin "accessibility" terms, was "definitely wrong"
and 'at the deepest level.., not only wrong but absurd." KENT GREENAwALT, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 258 (1988).
6. A possibly sacrilegious billboard that I passed recently on the Indiana Turnpike
reads:
WHAT PART OF "THOU SHALT NOT" DIDN'T YOU UNDERSTAND?
-GOD
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become unduly severe. Disagreements are likely to arise precisely
because people differ about the believability of the premises or
rationales that support different conclusions; if such differences are
enough to make a premise or rationale inadmissible in democratic
deliberation, then there will be precious little to deliberate about.7
So the argument about "accessibility," I believe, is artificial, and
it has distracted us from the deeper and more far-reaching reason
for resistance to the use of religion in democratic politics. And what
is that deeper reason? It was hinted at by Alexander Hamilton
during the Constitutional Convention.8 At one contentious point in
the proceedings, Benjamin Franklin proposed that daily sessions be
opened with prayer.9 The proposal was rejected, and Hamilton is
said to have remarked that the convention had no need of "foreign
aid."'0 Hamilton was no great democrat, of course, but this remark,
if actually made, suggests that he was ahead of his time in
anticipating the implications of a modem conception of democracy.
The basic thought is that democracy means self-government, and
self-government means government of and by ourselves: we should
make our own decisions, without outside assistance or interference.
In this respect, modem democracy is merely an extension to the
political level of what "autonomy" is thought to mean on the
individual level. Theorists may associate this position with Kant.
Kant, after all, was a major proponent of a highly influential view
of the autonomous, rational person which holds that enlightened
autonomy means "thinking for yourself,""1 and that an "inability to
make use of one's own understanding without the guidance of
7. Theorists often tryto minimize this difficultyby either equivocating-invokingavalue
such as "equality" that at some level is widely shared, while smuggling in a controversial
version of "equality" that is not shared-or by marginalizing those citizens who do not share
a particular view. For expositions of these tricks, see for example, STANLEY FISH, THE
TROUBLE wrrH PRINCIPLE 189-91,198-201 (1999); Michael P. Zuckert, Is Modern Liberalism
Compatible with Limited Government? The Case ofRawls, in NATURALLAwLIBERALISM,AND
MORALITY 72, 77-78 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
8. See Douglas Adair & Marvin Harvey, Was Alexander Hamilton a Christian
Statesman?, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 308, 315 n.8 (1955).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, reprinted in
WHAT Is ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANswERs AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY
QUESTIONS 58 (James Schmidt trans., ed., 1996).
[Vol. 42:685688
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another" is a form of "immaturity" reflective of "[1aziness and
cowardice."' 2 Autonomy entails "not submitting to groundless
authorities," or to "'alien' authorities'--a contestable category, no
doubt, but one that at least includes "state, church, majority,
tradition, or dictator."' This commitment to autonomy supports a
cluster of intertwined Kantian propositions that have become
virtually axiomatic for much of modern liberal democratic theory:
that "autonomy is the supreme good," 4 that only obligations that
we legislate for ourselves are binding on us, 5 that autonomy is the
essential basis of human dignity," and that "[tihere is no place for
others to tell us what morality requires, nor has anyone the
authority to do so-not our neighbors, not the magistrates and their
laws, not even those who speak in the name of God."'7
It is clear enough, even on the face of these assertions, that
projecting this notion of individual autonomy onto the political level
12. Id.
13. Onora ONeill, Vindicatingreason, in THE CAMBRIDGECOMPANIONTOKANT280,298-
99, 305 (Paul Guyer ed., 1992).
14. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 8 (1988); see also
William A. Galston, What is Living and What is Dead in Kant's Practical Philosophy?, in
KANT AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: THE CONTEMPORARY LEGACY 207,216 (Ronald Beiner &
William James Booth eds., 1993) (observing that for Kant, only"rational being has 'absolute
worthb"); cf IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J. Paton
trans., 1964) ("Persons, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence as an
object of our actions has a value for us: they are objective ends... ; for unless this is so,
nothing at all of absolute value would be found anywhere."); ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN
DEFENSE OFANARCHISM 72 (2d ed. 1998) ("When I place myself in the hands of another, and
permit him to determine the principles by which I shall guide my behavior, I repudiate the
freedom and reason which give me dignity. I am then guilty of what Kant might have called
the sin of willful heteronomy.").
15. See WOLFF, supra note 14, at 14 ("[Man] is autonomous. As Kant argued, moral
autonomy is a combination of freedom and responsibility; it is a submission to laws which one
has made for oneself.").
16. See VmroIuo HOSLE, OBJECTIVE IDEALISM, ETHIcs, AND POLITICs 49 (1998) (arguing
that "[olnly Kant's conception of freedom can give dignity to human beings").
17. J.B. Schneewind, Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral
philosophy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT, supra note 13, at 309, 310; see also
HOSLE, supra note 16, at 41:
Kant's thought implies a Copernican revolution not only in theoretical, but also
in practical philosophy: all heteronomous attempts at founding ethics are
rejected, and ethics is grounded in the autonomy of the subject. The
indissoluble link between freedom and ethics tries to bring the Enlightenment
into its truth: no external validity claims are accepted; every authority has to
justify itself before reason.
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will raise some delicate questions. Robert Paul Wolff argues
enthusiastically, for instance, that if the concept of autonomy is
carefully considered, it leads us inexorably to embrace anarchism.'"
Setting aside that sort of question, though, it is not hard to see how
someone with this general orientation would look with suspicion
on the resort to religion in democratic decision making-not
necessarily because of any singular hostility to religion per se, but
because religion typically includes something like deference to God,
and God (if there is a God) is an "alien authority." 9 Doing what God
wants because God wants it is not the same as thinking and acting
"for yourself." So deferring to God's will is a way of submitting to
"foreign aid," as Hamilton put it.
At this point, professors of philosophy might eagerly launch into
a discussion about what Kant really meant, or about how some of
his pronouncements should be understood in light of others, or
about which among modern positions that invoke the authority of
Kant in opposing deference to authority correctly understand his
views and which do not. Of course, the professors would disagree
about those matters, as professors of philosophy always do.2" I do
not want to get into such a discussion here, however, for several
sufficient reasons. In the first place, I lack the training (and
probably the kind of mind) needed to contribute much to that kind
of debate. More importantly, for our purposes it does not make
much difference what Kant really meant, or what he would or
should have said with regard to our issues. Like other great
thinkers, Kant released some potent ideas into the world, and
thereafter they no longer belonged to him. Others may have mis-
apprehended these ideas-or they may have apprehended them
more clearly than Kant himself did; but, in any case, what matters
for practical purposes is what Kant's ideas came to mean, not what
18. See generally WOLFF, supra note 14.
19. If there is not a God, then relying on religious reasons may seem like deferring to an
illusion, which is also something that enlightened theorists frown upon (whether or not they
succeed in avoiding the practice). Cf Steven D. Smith, Idolatry in Constitutional
Interpretation, in PAUL F. CAMPOS ET AL., AGAINST THE LAW 157 (1996).
20. Cf JOHN E. HARE, THE MORAL GAP: KANTiAN ETHICS, HUMAN LIMITS, AND GOD'S
ASSISTANCE 7 (1996) ("Kant is like other great philosophers; the basic components of his
theory are in dispute between interpreters, and so all the parts of the theory relying on these
components become controversial.").
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he meant. Or, probably more realistically, it may be that Kant was
not so much originating new ideas as articulating (in his own
idiosyncratic and ponderous way) notions that were (and are) "in
the air." So for some purposes the more cogent question might ask
not how well others understood Kant, but how well he understood
them. (Perhaps not all that well, I suspect, in either case).
In any event, for purposes of the present discussion what matters
is not what Kant meant, but instead what the ideas-or sentiments,
or slogans-often associated with him and lumped under the
heading of "autonomy" mean for us, and whether "autonomy" is
incompatible with the use of religion in public deliberation, and
whether "autonomy," as it has come to be understood, is a coherent
and attractive ideal. In short, is the introduction of religion into
public deliberation inappropriate because it offends a justified
commitment to human autonomy? This is the real question, I think,
that runs through the religion and democracy debate. It is a
difficult question and I for one am not completely sure about my
views on some aspects of it. In addition, as a law professor and not
a professional philosopher, I hardly feel competent to address this
sort of question directly. Instead, I wish to explore the question in
a way more fitting to a law professor-that is, by posing a
hypothetical story.2'
II.
Imagine that with the onset of a new millennium and the
spiritual exhaustion of conventional, Clintonesque politics, our
political culture experiences a series of dramatic and unexpected
developments. Among other things, a virulent nostalgia, or perhaps
a yearning for the "reenchantment" of the world, generates
surprisingly widespread support for a new political party that calls
itself the Democratic Royalist Party (the DRP). The DRP is led by
a charismatic figure named James (Jimmy) Stuart.
Like many historic figures, Stuart is a complex and probably
contradictory personality-passionate but also thoughtful, pure-
21. This story is, as noted, hypothetical, and all characters in the story are purely
fictional.
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hearted and strong-willed. Born in one of the few remaining
domestic log cabins, and largely self-tutored, Stuart is a quintes-
sential man of the people. But he also exudes a sort of innate
nobility, and this quality has surfaced in his political thought.
Somewhere in his self-education, Stuart stumbled upon some faded
seventeenth-century monarchical tracts and these led him to the
conclusion that the British monarch does indeed possess the right
of rulership, and that all English-speaking people owe allegiance to
the crown.
Stuart also continues to believe in democracy, however, and so he
goes to Washington with a novel proposal: adhering scrupulously to
the procedures of the Constitution (including Article V), Americans
should cede all political power to the Queen of England for a ten-
year term. At the end of that term, another election will be held to
determine whether this benevolent despotism will be renewed for
a second term, and so on. In this way, Stuart claims, the Queen's
right to rule will be respected, but the system will remain
fundamentally democratic.
As you might expect, this platform provokes fierce opposition.
Some of Stuart's opponents attack his ideas on the merits. They
criticize his monarchical assumptions on theoretical grounds; they
protest his proposal on pragmatic grounds. A few go so far as to
argue that the British royal line does not even exist. These critics
contend that the current so-called "royal family" is nothing more
than a sort of fraudulent facade; consequently, modern political
philosophy must cast off all vestiges of monarchical thought and
proceed with a constant awareness of the "death of royalty."
However, one of Stuart's most sophisticated critics-a descendant
of a long line of opponents of monarchy, or at least of English
monarchy, with the improbable name of Ronald the Bruce-adopts
a different perspective. Rather than criticize the DRP platform on
its merits, Ronald asserts that, what Stuart offers is not even a bad
political philosophy; it is no philosophy at all. That is because
monarchical ideas are inherently incompatible with democratic
assumptions: One cannot coherently maintain both that the British
crown has a right to rule and that democracy is the correct form of
government. So Stuart's views cancel themselves out so to speak.
And the proper conclusion, Ronald sometimes says, is not merely
[Vol. 42:685
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that Stuart's royalist views are wrong, but that Stuart himself does
not really hold those views (even though he thinks he does). In fact,
as Ronald sometimes says, monarchism is by now not even "a
thought to be had."
Though Stuart complains that this last claim overreaches, he is
brought by these criticisms to reconsider his views. Upon further
thought, he concludes that monarchy and democracy are indeed
incompatible if viewed as basic accounts ofpolitical authority. But
he still thinks there is something valuable and valid in his royalist
notions-something that needs to be articulated in a better, more
coherent way. Seeking to achieve reflective equilibrium between his
general democratic assumptions and his royalist intuitions, Stuart
comes to the conclusion that the Queen should be deferred to-not
because the royal line has any "right to rule," as he had inaptly put
the point, but rather because the Queen is quite simply the wisest
and most benevolent person in the world. Therefore, we in this
country should freely choose to defer to her judgments, not because
she has "authority" over us, but because this course of deference is
most conducive to our own welfare.
This revised view leads to a revised platform for the DRP, but one
that still lets the party keep its name. As modified, the platform no
longer calls for any official cession of political authority to the
Queen. In form, politics and lawmaking in this country will
continue as they have always done: Elections will be held, the
bicameral Congress will meet, bills passed in both houses will be
presented to the President and so forth. But the party pledges that
if it gains a dominant position in government, it will solicit and
defer to the Queen's judgments, categorically and on all matters.
Technically, the Queen's judgments will be advisory only, but in
practice they will be more than that; the party will treat them as
dispositive. It would make little sense to follow the Queen only
when she recommends what we would have independently chosen
anyway. The reason for deferring to the Queen, after all, is that she
is the embodiment of wisdom and benevolence, and if that is true
then it is precisely in cases of disagreement that deference to a
wiser source is most imperative.
Stuart maintains that this new position is thoroughly democratic
while also possessing the true and beneficial features of royalism.
20011 693
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Again, of course, many of his critics attack the platform on its
merits, arguing that the Queen is a fool, that she knows next to
nothing about this country, that deferring to her judgment would be
practically disastrous, and that she is not even a real queen. But as
it happens, conditions in the country are such that many citizens-
indeed, a majority-are drawn to Stuart's exalted opinion of the
Queen; a view that many thought had passed irretrievably from the
world has turned out to have surprising vitality after all. So Ronald
the Bruce does not challenge that view directly; he concedes, for
purposes of argument at least, that the Queen is the Queen and
that she is a veritable incarnation of wisdom and benevolence.
Nonetheless, Ronald still argues that the DRP platform is deeply
undemocratic. Indeed, he now adds that the platform is unconsti-
tutional because it violates the "republican form of government"
clause, which of course applies to the national government through
incorporation into the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.22
Stuart and his supporters are at first incredulous: How can their
program be undemocratic if it carefully preserves all of the central
democratic features-elections, majority rule, and so forth-and if
a majority of citizens choose to vote for it? Wouldn't it be more
undemocratic to prevent the citizens from adopting the program
that most of them prefer? But Ronald patiently explains that the
self-styled democratic royalists still have not thought through their
position carefully enough. The meaning of democracy cannot be
democratically determined, Ronald points out: If three-fourths of
the electorate voted for the proposition that "Democracy means the
absolute dictatorship of Napolean" their vote would not make it so.
Nor is democracy merely a set of forms, or procedures-or merely
hoops to jump through in making public decisions. There is nothing
sacred about democratic procedures for their own sake. In fact, the
forms in themselves are manifestly inefficient, expensive, and often
downright unseemly. We nonetheless adhere to those forms only
because they implement a deeper, more substantive political and
moral value or commitment.
And what is that value? Ronald explains that the value
underlying democracy is the ideal of self-rule, or self-determination,
22. Cf Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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or "autonomy-the concept of thinking and making decisions for
ourselves, or of being the authors of our own lives. The only duties
or moral obligations that are truly obligatory are the product not of
outside forces or authorities, but of self-legislation. And it is only by
virtue of possessing and exercising such autonomy that human
beings have a unique dignity and worth. Moreover, the ideal of self-
rule or autonomy cannot be realized through forms alone, devoid of
substance. Rather, in order to be responsible and autonomous
human beings, we ourselves must actually think through and then
make our own decisions. If instead we delegate those decisions to
some outside authority, we sacrifice our autonomy, our dignity-
indeed our very humanity.
In more familiar situations, Ronald continues, we readily
understand this point. In a marriage, for example, it sometimes
seems that one of the partners always does whatever the other
partner says to do. Suppose we cross-examine the deferential
spouse about this practice and he or she responds, "No, you don't
understand. I'm fully autonomous. It's true that I always and
unquestioningly obey my spouse, but I freely choose to do that. So
there's no conflict between complete autonomy and total
submission." We would easily see the delusion in this stance.
Similarly, we do not allow people to sell themselves into slavery-
even if that is what they say they want. We understand that such
a condition would in reality be a forfeiture of autonomy; and so we
would promptlyreject the argument that, by allowing and enforcing
contracts to enter into slavery, we would better facilitate the
exercise of people's autonomy. On similar reasoning, we do not
allow a legislature to bind itself in the future because, as the old
sages like Dicey and Blackstone explained, to allow the legislature
to do this would be to infringe on the legislature's own sovereignty.
So even though the current DRP platform retains the outward
forms of democracy, Ronald concludes, the platform would effect a
wholesale forfeiture of autonomy by entrusting all real thinking
and decision making to the Queen. But autonomy, or self-rule,
is the central value supporting democracy. Indeed, democracy is
little more than autonomy writ large-autonomy projected onto
the political stage. Consequently, the DRP philosophy remains
.69520011
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incoherent (not really a philosophy at all, as Ronald sometimes
says) and deeply undemocratic in the most fundamental sense.
Let us suppose that Ronald succeeds in convincing the electorate
on this point; consequently, the once vigorous DRP fades into
oblivion. Even Jimmy Stuart eventually concedes his error:
Convinced by Ronald that his underlying commitment has been to
autonomy all along, Stuart resolves to follow the path of autonomy
faithfully, wherever it may lead. The democracy-autonomy argu-
ment will also have the effect of discrediting several DRP offshoots.
For example, one splinter faction wants to adopt a policy of total
deference, not to the Queen of England, but rather to the Queen of
Sheba, who is said to have acquired tremendous wisdom somewhere
along the line. This faction hopes to avoid the rhetoric, which
proved highly effective in getting Ronald's main point across to the
philosophically innocent public, that the DRP program would in
essence rescind the Declaration of Independence and the
Revolutionary War, so that American patriots would have bled and
died in vain. After all, the Sheba party argues, we never fought a
war for independence from Sheba. Another faction, influenced by
Plato, proposes that deference be given to Jurgen Habermas on the
ground that he is the smartest philosopher in the world; and still a
third group proposes to confer the honor on Richard Rorty because
he is not only a really smart guy (though perhaps not quite as smart
as Habermas) but an American citizen to boot.
Although these proposals gain a smattering of initial support,
political theorists and citizens in general quickly realize that the
distinctions offered by these splinter parties are spurious. The
autonomy argument means that we should not delegate our
decision-making responsibilities to anyone. It doesn't really matter
whether the delegee is a monarch, or British, or a philosopher, or
a foreigner: The critical fact is that she or he is not us. What is
objectionable, in other words, is that we give decisional respon-
sibility away-not to whom we give it.
In fact, it doesn't really matter whether the recipient of deference
is a "who" or a "what." The point becomes important because still
another new political party, the AI Party, proposes that political
decisions be made by a new, staggeringly powerful supercomputer
dubbed "Shepherd." Shepherd has been programmed to make
[Vol. 42:685696
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decisions based on consulting all the political philosophies ever
devised and then applying those philosophies to a wealth of data far
surpassing the information that could be assimilated by any
human, or any discrete body of humans. The autonomy rationale
proves crucial here because the arguments on the merits are more
touch-and-go than they -were for some of the other proposals.
Scientists and philosophers are still arguing, that is, about the
precise nature of Shepherd's intellectual qualities-whether
Shepherd really "thinks," how Shepherd chooses among competing
philosophies, and so forth-but no one denies that, in some sense,
Shepherd has vastly greater cognitive capacities than even the
smartest human being. Moreover, with the other proposals there
was always the nagging concern that the recipient of deference
might be corrupted; he or she might use this newly conferred power
for his or her own interests and, thus, against ours. But Shepherd
is incorruptible and has no "self-interest," having been programmed
to act solely for the public good.
Nonetheless, the AI Party is voted down, mostly, it seems, on
autonomy grounds. After all, an opponent explains (in what has
become a familiar refrain), it is only autonomy that gives us the
dignity that makes us, as humans, distinctively valuable. Maybe
Shepherd would consistently make sounder, better informed
decisions than we do. But so what? What would it profit us to gain
the whole world and lose our own autonomy?
Ronald the Bruce feels the flush of success as one opponent of
autonomy after another goes down in defeat. But his satisfaction
turns to frustration when his own arguments come to be used
against him. It happens in this way: A new political movement has
given rise to a political party that calls itself the "Party of
Principle." This party proposes that all public decisions will be
made in accordance with what have come to be known as "the two-
and-a-half principles." These principles have been developed and
defended through intricate and abstruse argumentation by a group
of high profile philosophers. The merits of this political philosophy
are very much in dispute, of course, and it seems safe to predict
that the dispute will end only if and when people finally just lose
interest in the subject--or rather when political philosophers lose
interest, because they are the only people who manifest anyinterest
20011 697
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in the philosophical issues even now. Ronald the Bruce heartily
supports the Party of Principle. But critics of the Party object that,
regardless of the substantive merits of the formidable philosophical
issues, the "Platform of Principle" should be rejected because it is
undemocratic.
Ironically, it is Jimmy Stuart, chastened by his earlier experi-
ences, who now offers himself as the champion of autonomy. Stuart
makes this argument: "Ronald the Bruce said we couldn't defer to
the Queen, whether or not she is the best and wisest person on
earth, because this would forfeit our autonomy, which is what gives
us dignity and worth. On the same reasoning, we couldn't defer to
Habermas, or Rorty, or even to Shepherd, a machine. So I want to
know: Why is it any less a sacrifice of our autonomy to let our
decisions be determined by some set ofprinciples? If it's demeaning
to let your life be governed by a person, isn't it even more
demeaning to turn your life over to a formula?' Indeed, what's the
difference between Shepherd and a set of principles? Shepherd is
just a set of principles embodied in circuitry rather than ink; the
main difference is only that Shepherd is a lot more sophisticated
and less simple-minded than the two-and-a-half principles. Or what
if Shepherd were programmed only with the two-and-a-half
principles: Then would it be okay to make a dumbed-down
Shepherd our effective dictator? That in essence is what the Party
of Principle proposes."
Angered by this abuse of his ideas, Ronald agrees to debate
Stuart on national television. It would be tedious to recite the full
debate, but I need to report on one of the pertinent exchanges:
RONALD: You completely misunderstand. When we act on a
principle we don't sacrifice autonomy, because we
ourselves have willed-have legislated for ourselves-
the principle. Acting on a principle is not a violation of
23. Though Stuart himself reads philosophers only occasionally, a bookish friend points
out that in enjoining "thinking for oneself' and condemning the [1]aziness and cowardice
that lead most people to trust themselves to the "guidance of another," Kant did not seem to
distinguish between deferring to personal or impersonal authorities. It was objectionable to
defer to a "pastor who has a conscience for me" but also to "a book that has understanding
for me"; and "rules and formulas" could be the "fetters of an everlasting immaturity" as
much as kings or bishops could. KANT, supra note 14, at 58-59.
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autonomy; on the contrary, it is precisely the way we
realize and exercise our autonomy.
STUART: Well, of course, most of us haven't approved the two-
and-a-half principles. We don't even understand them,
or at least we don't accept the logic of the arguments
you give for those principles. So we aren't legislating for
ourselves; and you want to adopt the principles anyway.
But set that problem aside: even if every last one of
us did understand and approve those principles, we'd
still be turning our decisions over to them-letting a
formula or a set of principles determine our decisions in
the same way we'd have been letting Shepherd
determine our decisions if the AI Party had been
elected.
RONALD: It isn't the same thing at all. If you approve the
principles, then you choose to follow them. You're still
legislating for yourself.
STUART: That's just what I said about the Queen. It would have
been my decision--our decision-to defer to her. And
the decision would have been just as free as a decision
to be governed by a set of principles. Even more free,
maybe: aren't you always saying that if we are
reasonable and rational, then we "have to" adopt the
two-and-a-half principles because they are supported by
"compelling" arguments. But you said that sort of
decision was throwing away our autonomy.
RONALD: That was totally different. If we defer to the Queen, we
won't be thinking about the merits-the substance-of
individual decisions at all. If we adopt the two-and-a-
half principles, on the other hand, we will have thought
about the merits of our decisions. We'll have thought
through the merits in advance, so to speak, in deciding
to adopt the two-and-a-half principles.
2001] 699
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
STUART: Well, political views and philosophies have never
stayed stagnant, you know. And I see no reason to
suppose that the two-and-a-half principles will be the
end of political reflection. So wouldn't we need to think
through the substance of those principles fresh for each
new decision-to have the whole debate all over again
in the circumstances surrounding each new issue and
in light of our current views? If we really want to be
autonomous, I mean?
RONALD: Why on earth would we need to do that?
STUART: Because otherwise we might be turning our lives over
to principles that we once found attractive but that, if
we were to rethink them in light of further experience
and new considerations, we wouldn't even agree with.
RONALD:
STUART:
RONALD:
I don't understand. Nothing in the Platform of Principle
says that in adopting the two-and-a-half principles, we
have to adopt them irrevocably and for all time. If the
principles turn out to be deficient, we can always revise
or replace them.
But how will we know whether we would think they are
deficient, in any given case, unless we rethink them in
every case-have the full debate in light of current
considerations and current views?
This makes no sense. You seem to want a sort of
perpetual rethinking and rearguing of first principles.
Obviously that wouldn't be feasible; but there's an even
more serious problem. What you want would actually
eviscerate the meaning of living by a principle
altogether. What would it even mean to commit
yourself to a principle, or to have the sort of integrity
that comes from living by a principle, if you intend in
every situation to consider the matter from scratch and
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to follow the principle only if it happens to dictate doing
what seems best to you anyway?
Besides, nothing in our constitutional system works
like that. Take the privilege against self-incrimination.
We don't reexamine that privilege in every case; we
may not even remember for sure why it was adopted
in the first place. If we were to start from square
one, maybe .. ., just maybe, we'd still choose to adopt
a privilege against self-incrimination-maybe we
wouldn't. You could say the same for any other basic
constitutional principle. And of course sometimes we do
abandon old principles, or adopt new ones. But until we
decide to do that, we treat ourselves as bound. That's
what it means to be a "community of principle."
What you want, on the other hand, seems to be a sort
of perpetual, radical adhocery. That would destroy our
constitutional system.
STUART: Maybe it would. But so far as I can see, that's where
the logic of autonomy leads. And remember-it's
autonomy that gives us dignity. Autonomy is the source
of human worth. So if our constitutional order is
inconsistent with the logic of autonomy, then I think we
will just have to relinquish our constitutional order.
At this point the debate reached an impasse. In post-debate
interviews, Ronald insisted that Stuart had misunderstood the
meaning and implications of autonomy. Most mainstream political
philosophers agreed. But a few more adventurous political thinkers
and actors took just the opposite view. In fact, they thought that
Stuart had not actually taken the logic of autonomy far enough. So,
in the aftermath of the debate, new political factions emerged.
For instance, the Anti-Formalist Party argued that the very
notion of constitutionalism was undemocratic, because the Consti-
tution clearly placed a whole variety of limits on the people's right
of self-rule. This party started with a small insight: Somebody
noticed that the cumbersome amending procedures specified in
Article V severely limited "We the People" from expressing and
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implementing their will. So democratic Anti-Formalists started
saying that constitutional amendments should be allowed outside
the bounds of Article V. Amendments should not even have to be
written out and voted on at all if "We the People" did not feel so
inclined. (Ironically, this much of the Anti-Formalist's anti-
constitutional agenda was inspired by Ronald the Bruce himself,
who earlier in his career had devoted three entire books-admirers
reverently referred to these books simply as "the trilogy"-to the
development of these ideas.) More farsighted Anti-Formalists
quickly realized that the same logic applied to all of the formalities
that the Constitution places upon lawmaking.
Anti-Formalist Party conventions tended to be chaotic and a lot
of fun, with a good deal of posing and shouting. Sadly, the Party
never managed to agree on any formal platform. Some Anti-
Formalists advocated pure majority rule; others, who regarded
themselves as "purists," favored spontaneous mass direct democ-
racy. Perhaps the most attractive Anti-Formalist proposal, or at
least the one most often and enthusiastically defended by the
party's more respectable members, called for an implementation of
the general will of "We the People" by a small group of professors
and jurists who would acquire an uncanny, almost mystical access
to that will by attending conferences at Ivy League law schools.
An even more radical party, known as the Anti-Socialists,
advanced a platform that was individualistic to the point of being
anarchist. In contrast to the familiar sort of radicals who argue that
the government is illegitimate because it is not truly representative,
the Anti-Socialists argued that the government should be over-
thrown because it is representative; after all, turning over one's
decision-making responsibility to a representative is a classic
forfeiture of autonomy. Autonomy, they stressed, means self-rule,
and the polity doesn't have a "self": Only individuals have selves.
Jimmy Stuart initially sympathized with both of these parties,
but he soon concluded that the logic of autonomy was inconsistent
with organized political action altogether-there was something
faintly ridiculous about an organized political party of anarchists-
and so he retired from public activity, determined to lead a life of
pure, solitary self-legislation. Consequently, what happened after-
wards is perhaps not strictly relevant to apolitical parable. But, in
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case it matters, I can very quickly relate the rest of Stuart's curious
career.
He happened to run into Ronald the Bruce one evening at a
sidewalk cafe; and now that their political battles were over the old
antagonists actually felt like sitting down for a cordial chat. At least
it was cordial in the beginning. Stuart, who was wearing an old
sport coat, a tie, and a swimsuit but no shoes, explained his current
thinking. In order to be autonomous, he said, he was adopting a
policy of complete spontaneity-at least for the moment. "I do what
I feel like doing. Say what I feel like saying. Take what I feel like
taking."
Unconsciously putting his hand on his wallet, Ronald explained
that in a wholly nonjudgmental way he fully and equally respected
Stuart's views about the good life--even though he felt obligated to
add, with all due respect, that as a strictly philosophical matter
Stuart was utterly confused, as usual. "Autonomy" most emphat-
ically did not mean "doing whatever you feel like doing at the
moment." On the contrary, Stuart ought to realize that he was a
rational being, that he truly exercised his autonomy only by acting
rationally, that acting rationally entailed acting only on principles
that he could consistently will to be universally observed, and that
it followed from this that he ought to treat all other rational beings
with respect-as "ends" not "means."
Stuart replied that none of this made any sense. He was a
rational being, to be sure, but he was also an emotional being, an
intuitive being, and a spiritual being. If "rationality" was what
separated him from stones, plants, and beasts, as Ronald had
argued, emotion, intuition, and spirit were what distinguished him
from Shepherd. So he did not understand how "autonomy"justified
letting his "reason" enslave or subordinate the rest of him: To
identify the rational part of him with his "self," or his "being,"
seemed arbitrary-indeed irrational. Moreover, even insofar as he
was a rational being it did not seem to follow that he must act only
on universal principles-"You've heard of instrumental rationality,
haven't you?"--and in any case he was quite sure he could craft
universal principles that would suit anything he truly felt like
doing, and in this sense would capture his sincere motivation. "I
take your beret," he said, seizing Ronald's beret, on the universal
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principle that 'Jimmy Stuart gets whatever he wants.' I really,
sincerely wish that everyone would accept and act on that principle.
It's not going to happen, of course-but where's the logical
inconsistency?" Finally, the part about all persons being "ends" not
"means" seemed intolerably vague and a non sequitur to boot
(though it was, Stuart conceded, a "charming sentiment"). "So I still
don't see how being 'autonomous' doesn't mean doing whatever I
choose to do."
At this point, Ronald lost patience and called Stuart a
"philosophical moron." Stuart shot back that Ronald simply lacked
the courage of his convictions, and, hence, was constantly resorting
to sophistry to invent spurious limits on autonomy whenever the
concept became troublesome. "When did philosophizing about
'autonomy' ever lead you to a conclusion you didn't like in the first
place?" Stuart demanded. The conversation broke down, but rather
than part as permanent enemies the pair agreed to meet
again-same time, same place-one week later. At the appointed
time, Ronald came to the restaurant prepared with a lucid
presentation organized around three extremely subtle distinctions
that Stuart, and nearly everyone else, had somehow overlooked.
But he wasn't able to give the presentation, because Stuart never
showed up.
Several weeks later the two happened to pass on the sidewalk.
For a moment Ronald failed to recognize Stuart, who was shirtless,
unshaven, and a bit wild-eyed, but Stuart grabbed Ronald by the
arm and, in what Ronald charitably interpreted as a friendly
gesture, gave him a vigorous slap on the back. Taken by surprise,
Ronald stammered "hello" and then asked why Stuart had not
appeared at the scheduled meeting. "Well, I know I had promised
to come," Stuart said. "And I even intended to come. But at the last
moment, I didn't feel like it. And I thought, ... -let's see, what did
I think?--oh, yes, I'm like, 'Jimmy, you're an autonomous self. I'm
not sure whether you're the same autonomous self that was in the
restaurant with Ronald last week... but be that as it may, you're
an autonomous self, and you can't be bound by old promises.'...
'Dead hand of the past,' 'Can't bind the sovereign,' and all that, you
know.... So I'm like, 'Jimmy, you're only bound by obligations that
you legislate for yourself, and keeping promises--or at least
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keeping this promise-isn't an obligation that you choose to impose
on yourself.' So in the plenitude of my autonomy, I freely decided
not to come." And he erupted in a roar of laughter that to Ronald
sounded almost maniacal.
Realizing that the case was hopeless, or worse, Ronald shook his
head sadly and walked on. An image of Frankenstein flashed
through his mind, and he glanced back over his shoulder once or
twice. But Stuart did not follow. And in fact, that was the last time
the two ever met.
Years later, though, Ronald heard reports about what had
happened to Stuart. The reports were second or third-hand, and
they seemed to contradict each other. So Ronald was not sure which
of the reports, if any, was correct.
According to one story, Stuart ended up in a mental institution,
suffering from severe schizophrenia. A different report had it that
Stuart, desperate and sick to death of autonomy, finally resolved to
act on his original inclination. So he took a vow of fidelity to the
Queen. Given that Stuart was not known to have had any personal
audience with the Queen, it was not exactly clear what this vow
might have meant. Stuart had believed, of course, that the Queen
was the embodiment of wisdom and benevolence, so maybe his vow
meant that he would make decisions by reflecting, using a sort of
"imaginative reconstruction," about what a truly wise and good
person would recommend. Or maybe Stuart had gotten hold of
information about the Queen's views and values. In any case,
according to this story, Stuart's vow of fidelity somehow helped him
pull his fragmented self back together, so that, in the end, he
achieved a kind of peace, and even self-mastery, that had previously
eluded him. In trying to relinquish his autonomy, ironically, he had
actually acquired it.
Nothing in these reports led Ronald to question his own
entrenched commitment to autonomy-to "autonomy," that is,
interpreted in the way that reasonable people would understand it.
But he was moved to wonder whether autonomy was a concept, or
possibly a conception, that could safely be entrusted to non-
philosophers. Maybe the mass of people would be better off
exercising their freedom under the benign, watchful tutelage of the
enlightened. In order to be effective, of course, this tutelage would
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need to be regularized and supported by the means typically used
by the state; it would need to take the form of a sort of enforceable
"freedom's law."
III.
So much for the story. What is the moral? But as you know
perfectly well, the Socratic code of the law professor prohibits me
from answering that question for you. And in a Socratic spirit I am
also constrained to say that I do not know the answer.
But I suppose it would not transgress the rules to say this much
as a partial conclusion to the story: It seems that the fundamental
modern concept of "autonomy"-the concept that pervades the
religion and democracy debate, as well as modern political thought
generally-is a problematic notion.2 Whether this notion offers a
coherent and attractive ideal for guiding our moral and political
deliberation seems very much open to question.
24. For a helpful critical consideration, see generally DWORKIN, supra note 14
(describing and criticizing various theories regarding autonomy).
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